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Introduction
This essay explores the relationship between reality and how we describe reality. On an individual basis, we hold certain facts about what exists to actually be the case in reality; these are our 
ontological commitments, and we express these commitments each and 
every time we speak. One may be more or less explicit about what he is on-
tologically committed to — for instance, one may say “apples exist” to express 
his commitment to the existence of apples or, at another time, he might 
say “some apples are red.” Though the latter sentence does not explicitly 
state the existence of apples, I will, for the purposes of this essay, take both 
sentences to be ontologically committing.1
The problem with many of the ontological statements we make is 
that when we write them out in their logical form, their symbolizations 
do not always translate to exactly that which we intend for them to state. 
For instance, suppose I’m rummaging through my refrigerator when my 
roommate calls out to me from the other room, “Is there any pizza left?” 
I then look through the fridge to find that we’re all out of pizza, and so I 
1 The sentence “some apples are red” entails an implicit commitment to the existence of apples. 
The importance of making the distinction between explicit and implicit commitment is nicely 
argued for in Howard Peacock, “Two Kinds of Ontological Commitment,” The Philosophical 
Quarterly, 61, no. 242 (2011): 79 – 104.
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respond “No, there’s no pizza.” Surely I mean to say “there’s no pizza in the 
fridge,” though, as my response stands, we might symbolize it as follows: 
~∃x (x is a slice of pizza), which appears to express that I’ve claimed “there 
is no pizza in the entire world.” Does this mean that I’ve ontologically 
committed myself to the non - existence of pizza? I should hope not, since I 
meant for my statement to be restricted to the domain “in my refrigerator,” 
and it would be unreasonable to suppose that my roommate would have any 
confusion about this implied restriction. However, ontologists are much 
less understanding than college roommates when it comes to discerning 
implicit commitments from our claims in their logical form (although, 
perhaps this is just because pizza ceasing to exist is much more tragic for 
college students than for ontologists). This example represents only one of 
many different ways in which inconsistencies between our natural - language 
claims and their symbolic counterparts cause problems of ambiguity for our 
ontological commitments; though it strongly illustrates the specific part of 
the problem that I intend to investigate, which is expressed by the following 
question: How can we symbolize our statements so that we ontologically 
commit ourselves to exactly that which we intend to commit ourselves to, 
and nothing more nor less?
I will discuss the accounts of three philosophers who each hold a 
unique perspective regarding what is required of a language that serves to 
describe reality. In section I, I will present Willard Van Orman Quine’s 
quantificational theory of ontological claims and Kit Fine’s objection to 
it. Quine suggests that we should use an existential quantifier to state 
that a thing exists, whereas Fine thinks that the solution is not to use a 
quantifier, but an operator that introduces a term to be constitutive of 
reality. In sections II and III, I will explain Fine’s reality operator and two 
potential problems for his account. Then, in section IV, I will discuss Ted 
Sider’s solution, which offers a different approach to the notion of reality 
altogether. Sider explains that there is a fundamental structure of reality 
that is distorted by the languages we use to attempt to describe it. Sider 
introduces the notion of naturalness, which, I will argue, can be adopted by 
Fine’s account to resolve the problems with the reality operator. Finally, in 
section V, I will present my hybrid - account of Fine’s reality operator and 
Sider’s notion of naturalness, which I call “the natural definition of reality.” 
I will argue that this definition can make sense of using a reality operator to 
express our ontological commitments.
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I. The Quantificational View of Ontological Claims
Quine’s quantificational theory of ontological claims serves to address 
the question “how should we formulate the central question of ontology?” 
Quine’s account essentially equates ontological questions with quantifica-
tional questions such that existence - likeness, or ontological commitment, 
is expressed using quantifiers ‘∃x’ (Quine 7). For instance, when we ask “do 
numbers exist?” we are asking ‘are there numbers?’ since, under the quan-
tificational view, the latter question may be formulated from the former 
by way of clarification. Therefore, ‘∃x’ is the existential quantifier, and the 
question is whether “∃x (x is a number)” (Fine 1).
Fine objects to Quine’s solution on the grounds that the quantifi-
cational account “gets the basic logic of ontological commitment wrong.” 
Fine’s argument for his objection goes as follows: He supposes a realist 
about integers who expresses his ontological commitment to the integers 
with the claim “integers exist,” and a realist about natural numbers who 
expresses her ontological commitment to natural numbers with the claim 
“natural numbers exist.” Intuitively, Fine explains, it is the realist about 
integers who holds the stronger position, since committing to the integers 
is a commitment to more numbers than is committing to the natural 
numbers; namely, to the negative numbers (in addition to the natural 
numbers). However, Fine asserts that on the quantificational construal of 
these claims, it is the realist about natural numbers who, in fact, holds 
the stronger position. His reasoning is that, under the quantificational 
account, the claim “integers exist” amounts to claiming that “there is at 
least one integer” (which may or may not be a natural number), while the 
claim “natural numbers exist” amounts to claiming that “there is at least 
one natural number” (i.e. an integer that is also nonnegative).
The commitment to integers can be taken to be the commitment to 
F’s, and the commitment to natural numbers, then, is the commitment to 
F &G’s (the nonnegative integers). Fine explains, “The commitment to F’s 
should in general be [stronger] than the commitment to F &G’s, whereas 
the claim that there are F’s is in general weaker than the claim that there 
are F &G’s” (Fine 7). Therefore, Fine concludes that we should do away 
with the existential quantifier because it misconstrues the basic logic of 
ontological commitment.
II. Fine’s Solution: The Reality Operator
Fine proposes that instead of using quantifiers to express ontological 
commitment, we should use a reality operator to make explicit the concept 
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of “reality.” The reality operator is a sentential operator, similar to the 
word “not,” in that it can be placed in front of a sentence f to express “In 
reality, it is the case that f”; or, alternatively, “It is constitutive of reality 
that f.” According to Fine, “Given the reality operator, we can now define 
an object to be real if, for some way the object might be, it is constitutive 
of reality that it is that way (in symbols, Rx =df ∃fR[fx]).”2 For example, 
on this account, the numbers 4 and 5 would be real if it is constitutive of 
reality that “5 is greater than 4” or “4 is less than 5” (12).3 What’s more is 
Fine explains that the notion is to be taken as a primitive. He says that he 
sees no way to define the concept of reality in different terms.
Fine’s reasoning for why the reality operator is the better option 
can be understood through the following example: If we want to commit 
ourselves to the existence of F ’s using the claim “F ’s exist,” we intend to 
commit ourselves to the existence of all of the F ’s; whereas, under the 
quantificational account, in which “F ’s exist” is equivalent to “∃xFx ,” 
our claim merely amounts to claiming “there exists at least one F.” But 
we want to commit ourselves to all of the F ’s, not just at least one of 
them. Therefore, Fine thinks that using the reality operator allows us 
to be able to express our commitments to exactly those things that we 
intend to commit ourselves to. He calls this “universal commitment,” 
as opposed to “quantificational commitment” (Fine 9).
III. Two Potential Problems for Fine’s Account
A. The Equivocation Objection
My first objection to Fine’s account is with regard to his argument 
that I discussed in section I above; particularly, concerning his use of the 
word “stronger” in assessing the relative strengths of the claims “integers 
exist” and “natural numbers exist.” I will argue that that Fine employs two 
different meanings of the word and, hence, equivocates on “strength.”
2 The quantifier “for some f” in this formulation is best taken to be a genuinely second - order 
quantifier, and it is essential that x should have an actual occurrence in the proposition fx . 
Furthermore, the ‘R’ to the right of the definition merely indicates that the proposition fx has 
some occurrence in the world.
3 Any true sentence containing the terms ‘4’ and ‘5’ would suffice.
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In the first sense of the word, Fine explains that, generally (i.e. in their 
natural - language form), “integers exist” is an ontologically stronger claim 
than “natural numbers exist” because to posit the integers is to posit more 
numbers than is to posit the natural numbers (i.e. the negative numbers 
in addition to the natural numbers); that is, commitment to the integers 
entails commitment to the natural numbers. We might appropriately refer 
to this first sense of “strength” as that which posits more things.
In the second sense of the word, Fine explains that, in their quanti-
ficational form, “natural numbers exist” is an ontologically stronger claim 
than “integers exist” because “integers exist” expresses the non - conjunctive 
∃x (x is an integer), whereas “natural numbers exist” expresses the 
conjunctive ∃x (x is an integer & nonnegative), and conjunctions are more 
difficult to falsify than non - conjunctions. We might appropriately refer to 
this second sense of “strength” as that which is more difficult to make false.
In both cases, Fine uses the phrase “stronger claim” to indicate “that 
claim which holds a stronger ontological commitment.” Therefore, if he 
is to contrast two ontological claims and their relative strengths in their 
natural - language form with their counterparts in their quantificational 
form for the purpose of deriving a contradiction, then his uses of the 
word “stronger” must be univocal throughout; otherwise, his argument 
is fallacious. Hence, Fine’s argument against the quantificational view 
appears to be invalid due to his use of equivocal meanings of “strength.” 
In light of this problem, we might doubt that Fine has provided us with 
sufficient reason to abandon the use of the existential quantifier.
B. The “Primitiveness Problem” for the Reality Operator
My second objection to Fine’s account is with regard to his reality 
operator. By introducing the reality operator, Fine has effectively separated 
existence from reality such that a thing may exist, but it need not be con-
stitutive of reality that it does. One response to Fine’s account might be 
that he is too quick to make the jump to operationalism. Some philoso-
phers, such as Friederike Moltmann, have argued that we can achieve the 
same result using a primitive existence - predicate that Fine claims to have 
achieved using a primitive reality operator. In which case, for example, one 
might commit herself to the existence of integers in the following way: 
∀x (Ix ⊃ Ex), where ‘I’ is the predicate for integer and ‘E’ is the predicate 
for existence (Moltmann 2010). Fine’s problem with this notion is that it 
is uninformative of what existence is (Fine 11). For on one interpretation, 
the existence - predicate makes existence trivial. To see this, consider what is 
being said in the symbolization above: “For all x, if x is an integer, x exists.” 
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This makes existence trivial because if I were to ask “do integers exist?” an 
acceptable response would be “sure they do, just ask your tax accountant!”
Now, considering this line of argument against the existence - predicate, 
a significant problem with Fine’s reality operator becomes clear: The same 
argument works equally well against the primitive reality operator. The 
reality operator needs to be given truth conditions or else we learn no 
more about Fine’s notion of reality than we learn about existence if we 
take the existence predicate to be a primitive. I will refer to this as the 
“primitiveness problem” for Fine’s reality operator.
Though these objections present some serious problems for Fine’s 
account, I believe that the reality operator can be reinvigorated. In section 
IV, I will discuss the account of Ted Sider, which can be taken to be an 
alternative solution to the problem of ontological commitment. Sider 
offers a notion of reality in terms of its fundamental structure. I will show 
how incorporating aspects of Sider’s account can relieve Fine’s account of 
the two problems I discussed above.
IV. The Fundamental Structure of Reality
In his book, Writing the Book of the World, Sider explains that the 
ultimate goal of metaphysics is insight into the structure of reality and 
insight into what the world is like at the most fundamental level. He asserts 
that discerning reality’s structure entails finding patterns and figuring out 
categories for describing the world. Often, He refers to this process as 
“carving reality at its joints” (Sider 1).
These terms — structure, fundamental, and joint - carving — seem vague, 
and it is almost as if Sider intends for them to be this way. In my opinion, 
an attempt to define them explicitly defeats the purpose of our using them. 
This is because there is a sort of intuition behind our understanding of 
that which is fundamental and joint - carving in the world. To understand 
this, consider the following example: Imagine three objects; two electrons 
in identical intrinsic states, and a cow. Sider explains that it is the most 
natural thing in the world to say that the two electrons go together, and 
neither goes with the cow. Hence, the three objects can be divided into 
two groups — one containing the two electrons and the other containing 
the cow. It would seem very unnatural and puzzling if one were to suggest 
any other grouping of the three objects, most likely because the electrons 
share nothing in common with the cow and many things in common with 
each other. This sort of investigation is what Sider means by “carving reality 
at its joints”; discerning what is most natural about reality and ontologi-
cally committing ourselves to those natural things. “[If] we could make a 
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distinction between genuine features — features that are fundamental, that 
carve nature at the joints, whose sharing makes for similarity — and the rest, 
then we could say what we want” (Sider 4).
Sider thinks that we need to investigate reality’s objective structure 
before we can do metaphysics. This is important because some philoso-
phers, such as Eli Hirsch, believe that many metaphysical debates are 
“merely verbal disputes;” that is, our respective languages distort our 
metaphysical disagreements (Hirsch 231). Hence, there arises the problem 
that such disputes are not genuine. It is reasonable, then, to argue that no 
position is better than any other. If this is the case, then on what meta-
physical accounts should we ground our ontology? In the spirit of Sider, 
the answer to this question is “on those which carve at the joints of reality.” 
Creating the language of ontology, or “Ontologese,” as he calls it, is Sider’s 
aim.
Naturally, then, the question becomes: What will this language 
consist of? This is a more difficult question to tackle but Sider has left 
us with certain guidelines for determining what carves at the joints. For 
my purposes, I will not address all of these guidelines, but I intend to 
discuss one in particular — that “only the most fundamental things are to 
be included.” Since every word in this new language must be joint - carving, 
no term or sentence can be less fundamental than any other. For Sider, 
the window, so to speak, into “the fundamental” is that which is “natural.” 
That is, there is a natural interpretation of the way that things stand in 
reality, and the task of discerning that which is fundamental first requires 
examining what is natural. Our job, then, is to determine which terms are 
more natural than others, and only the most natural terms will be included 
in the language of ontology. This is what I mean when I say “naturalness.”
In order to state facts of comparative naturalness, Sider proposes 
taking a two - placed operator “N,” which operates on open - sentences and 
yields a closed sentence. A sentence of the form “N(f,ψ),” where f and ψ 
are sentences which may have free variables, states that “f is more natural 
than ψ” (Sider 21) The naturalness operator is important because we can 
use it to determine what statements should reflect reality’s fundamental 
structure. Consider the following two sentences: “Pigs have wings” and 
“Pigs roll around in the mud.” There is nothing more fundamental than 
these sentences. For if we consider the terms involved — pigs, wings, mud, 
etc. — they are each equally basic and fundamental. Nonetheless, “pigs 
roll around in the mud” is clearly more natural than “pigs have wings.” 
Thus, we may express the sentences’ comparative - naturalness as follows: 
N(M,W), where M stands for “pigs roll around in the mud” and W stands 
for “pigs have wings.”
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For the remainder of this essay, I will present my account for why 
Fine’s reality operator can benefit from incorporating Sider’s naturalness-
relation as a condition for that which is stated to be constitutive of reality. 
That is, we can use the naturalness - relation for determining whether or 
not something is indeed constitutive of reality (i.e., whether it is worthy 
of placement within the scope of the reality operator). Doing so should 
serve to circumvent the primitiveness problem for the reality operator 
because, where Fine’s account is accused of being uninformative of what 
reality is like, Sider’s account is acclaimed for tackling just that. The 
naturalness - relation can provide the terms by which we can attribute truth 
conditions to the reality operator.
Employing the notion of naturalness in Fine’s account should also 
validate his argument against the quantificational view, which I objected to 
on the grounds that he equivocates on the word “stronger” (see sub - section 
A in section III above). For, since Fine refers to “positing more things” as 
the “intuitive position,” when he says “the claim ‘integers exist’ is stronger 
than the claim ‘natural numbers exist’,” he might be correct, if what he 
means to say is that “the claim ‘integers exist’ is more natural than the claim 
‘natural numbers exist’.” On this construal of Fine’s argument — in which we 
talk about strength in terms of that which is more natural — his assertions 
about the relative strengths of the two claims become harmless since he 
is merely asserting that expressing our ontological commitments using 
quantifiers is less natural than expressing our commitments in ordinary 
language.
V. The Natural Definition of Reality
With that, let’s consider what this new formulation will look like. I 
will refer to it as “the natural definition of reality.”4 Recall that for Fine, a 
term x is constitutive of reality when there is some sentence f containing 
x, such that the proposition f(x) has an actual occurrence in the world — in 
symbols, Rx =
df
 ∃fR[f(x)]. Given the primitiveness problem for this 
locution, what I am suggesting goes as follows:
R[f(x)] ≡ [f(x) & ~∃ψ(x)(N(ψ ,f))]
which reads: It is constitutive of reality that f(x) if and only if f(x) 
and it is not the case that there is some sentence ψ containing x such that 
4 “The natural definition of reality” was coined by my Metametaphysics professor, David McEl-
hoes.
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ψ is more natural than f.5 With this new formulation, we can now define 
both x to be real and the sentence f(x) to be real. Because of the latter, 
this definition gets past the primitiveness problem on the grounds that 
the sentence f makes for a description of reality; that is, a description of 
what x is like in reality. The two conjuncts that make up the consequent of 
the biconditional must be individually explained in order to understand 
my reasoning behind the definition. First, I will address the conjunct 
~∃ψ(x)(N(ψ ,f)), then I will explain the importance of the conjunct f(x).
f and ψ represent two sentences that both contain the term x. 
Suppose that x stands for “electron,” f(x) stands for “electrons are subatomic 
particles,” and ψ(x) stands for some sentence that describes electrons as 
well. The naturalness - condition manipulates the reality operator such that 
when we insert these sentences into the definition, it reads “It is constitu-
tive of reality that electrons are subatomic particles if and only if it is not 
the case that there is some sentence ψ containing the term “electron” that 
is more natural than ‘electrons are subatomic particles’.” If any such sentence 
ψ is more natural than f, then it is not constitutive of reality that f(x). 
Whereas, if it is the case that f is more natural than any other sentence 
ψ(x), then it is constitutive of reality that f(x).6
However, if we only take the definition this far, a problem arises. 
Consider the fundamental sentence “Some electrons satisfy contradic-
tions.” This sentence is false, but there is nothing more natural than it. 
It mentions only fundamental things — electrons, contradictions, etc. — and 
it discusses only logical truth or falsehood. Since there is nothing more 
natural than this sentence, it follows from the natural definition of reality 
that it really is the case that some electrons satisfy contradictions (McElhoes, 
D., personal conversation, April 28, 2013).
The left - conjunct of the definition ‘f(x)’ serves to evade this 
difficulty. To see this, consider the statement f(x) ≡ f(x). This is trivial on 
its own, but imposing the requirement that f is true on the reality operator 
rules out any false statements — such as “some electrons satisfy contradic-
tions” — as being constitutive of reality. To incorporate the ‘Reality’ of f(x) 
and connect it to the naturalness - relation, we simply need to add the reality 
operator to the left side of the biconditional and the naturalness operator 
5 It is important not to confuse the notation ‘f(x)’ to signify that f is a predicate. For my pur-
poses, f(x) merely represents a sentence f containing a term x.
6 Note that I am not attempting to offer a definition for what more natural than entails. Whatever 
‘naturalness’ means, I am supposing that the relative naturalness of claims determines which 
claims are constitutive of reality.
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to the right side — in symbols: R[f(x)] ≡ [f(x) & ~∃ψ(x)(N(ψ ,f))]. 
Hence, “the natural definition of reality.”
Conclusion: The Case for Ontological Commitment
What progress does the natural definition of reality make toward resolving 
the problem of unwanted ontological commitment? If Fine’s notion of the 
‘strength’ of ontological claims is in fact defined by how natural a claim is, then 
my definition certainly points us in the right direction. However, to explore 
what a correct account would look like and to describe what that account entails 
are drastically different endeavors. The most notable difference is that the latter 
gives us a solution, whereas the former makes progress, but is incomplete.
The next step is to determine what it means for one thing to be more 
natural than another. I have proposed that the truth of a claim weighs heavily 
on whether the claim is constitutive of reality, and that truth is an individual 
requirement, separate from the naturalness condition; yet both must be met in 
order for a thing to really be the case in reality. Therefore, it follows that the truth 
of a claim has nothing to do with how natural it is. This seems odd. Though, 
at the same time, it does corroborate Sider’s notion of ‘reality’s structure’. On 
the very first page of his book, Sider explains that “[discerning structure] means 
inquiring into how the world fundamentally is, as opposed to how we ordinarily 
speak or think of it” (Sider 1). So it would make sense that truth - value and 
naturalness are wholly unrelated concepts. For truth - value is concerned with 
language, but naturalness and fundamentality, as Sider describes them, have 
nothing to do with language. These are concepts that we use in our attempt to 
get at what reality actually is like; with the language we use to describe it aside. 
But how could we possibly do this? Trying to describe reality (or anything, for 
that matter) without using language would be like trying to lift yourself up by 
your boot straps. This leads me to believe that metaphysics and ontology are not 
intended to mix.
It’s like having a complex idea, taking short - hand notes on a piece of scrap 
paper that only you can perfectly understand, and then delivering those notes to 
someone else to articulate what you are trying to say, giving him no explanation 
whatsoever. Metaphysics is the language we use to do ontology but the problem 
is that the finished product is intended to reflect reality’s structure, while 
metaphysics (the means), is like the piece of scrap paper. It distorts what we mean 
to say. For this reason, I believe that Sider is on the right track. Carving reality 
at its joints and then creating an objective language to talk about it is key to es-
tablishing a perfect ontology. Therefore, we must discern reality’s fundamental 
structure before we can know to what to ontologically commit ourselves.
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